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THE AFTER-SHOCKS OF TWOMBLY: WILL
WE "NOTICE" PLEADING CHANGES?
ETTIE WARDt
INTRODUCTION
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court on May 21, 2007, and has already been cited
more than 9,400 times as of March 15, 2008.2 The majority
decision was not subtle in broadcasting its dissatisfaction with
notice pleading,3 at least in large, complex antitrust conspiracy
cases, and the dissent certainly viewed the majority's holding as
a procedural revolution. 4 Twombly was not to be ignored, and
within a mere eight months every Circuit 5 had at least paid lip
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Olga Petrovsky, Class of 2009, in
researching this Article.
1 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
2 According to a Westlaw search, approximately 5,000 cases cited Twombly in
February 2008; within two weeks, another 1,500 courts had joined in.
3 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-69; infra text accompanying notes 43-53.
4 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the "Court's
dramatic departure from settled procedural law").
5 See, for example, the following circuit court decisions:
First Circuit: Clark v. Boscher, No. 06-2473, 2008 WL 250297 (1st Cir. Jan. 31,
2008).
Second Circuit: Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., No. 06-3886-c, 2008 WL 313795 (2d Cir. Feb.
6, 2008); Goldstein v. Pataki, No. 07-2537-cv, 2008 WL 269100 (2d Cir. Feb. 1,
2008); Baron v. Complete Mgmt., Inc., No. 06-3672-cv, 2008 WL 205327 (2d
Cir. Jan. 24, 2008); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
Third Circuit: Phillips v. County of Allegheny, No. 06-2869, 2008 WL 305025 (3d Cir.
Feb. 5, 2008); Foreman v. Lowe, No. 07-1995, 2008 WL 161471 (3d Cir. Jan. 16,
2008).
Fourth Circuit: Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., No. 07-1084,
2008 WL 238562 (4th Cir. Jan. 29, 2008); Lanier v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 06-
1986, 2007 WL 4270847 (4th Cir. Dec. 5, 2007).
Fifth Circuit: Burnette v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-30540, 2007 WL 4328808 (5th
Cir. Dec. 10, 2007).
Sixth Circuit: Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., 512 F.3d 338 (6th Cir.
2008); Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2007).
Seventh Circuit: Jervis v. Mitcheff, No. 06-4236, 2007 WL 4355433 (7th Cir. Dec. 13,
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service to Twombly; the Supreme Court had even cited it twice
before the 2007 term ended in June. 6
The bar and academic community immediately began to
weigh in on the question of whether the "new" standard applies
to all civil cases or merely to antitrust conspiracy cases, with
most commentators concluding that the pleading landscape had
shifted. 7 The trickier questions are likely to revolve around how
to satisfy the new standard in different types of cases.
2007); Bartley v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., No. 07-2059, 2007 WL 4328666 (7th Cir.
Dec. 6, 2007).
Eighth Circuit: Abdullah v. Minnesota, No. 06-4142, 2008 WL 283693 (8th Cir. Feb.
4, 2008).
Ninth Circuit: Grabinski v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 05-16987,
2008 WL 266722 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2008); Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
512 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2008).
Tenth Circuit: Burris v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 07-6181, 2008 WL 194916 (10th
Cir. Jan. 24, 2008); Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007).
Eleventh Circuit: Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. Consol., No. 05-12988, 2008 WL
314962 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2008); McCray v. Potter, No. 06-16678, 2008 WL
142032 (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008).
D.C. Circuit: Powers v. Wickline, No. 07-7091, 2007 WL 3230211 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24,
2007).
Federal Circuit: McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
6 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); Erickson v.
Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
7 See, e.g., the following articles for a discussion of pleading standards after
Twombly.
Finding pleading standards changed:
Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L. REV. BRIEF 135 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/
07/09/dodson.pdf; Richard 0. Halloran, A Return to Fact Pleading? Viable
Complaints After Twombly, 44 ARiz. ATT'Y 20, 24 (2007) ("[T]he rationale for
Twombly should extend broadly to a wide range of federal cases."); Michael C.
Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts-Again,
FINDLAw, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html;
Ted Frank, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, POINTOFLAW.COM, May 21, 2007,
http://pointoflaw.com/archives/003906.php.
Arguing that general pleading standards are not affected beyond antitrust Section 1
conspiracy claims:
John H. Bogart, The Supreme Court Decision in Twombly: A New Federal
Standard?, UTAH B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 20, 22 (2007) ("At least for the
foreseeable future, its effects are likely to be confined to antitrust litigation.");
Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) ("[Ilt is a misreading
of Twombly to extend 'plausibility' beyond [its antitrust] context.").
Arguing pleading standards for certain types of cases likely to change:
Linda S. Mullenix, Troubling Twombly, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 13
("Twombly may herald a new era of rigorous analysis of class action pleading
that may make federal courts a difficult venue to pursue class action relief.").
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The Twombly decision would not seem so significant if we
did not already have a well-rehearsed narrative on the role
pleadings should play under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This narrative was based, in part, on the major shift
in emphasis of the Federal Rules drafters from reliance on
pleadings to reliance on pretrial discovery and motion practice to
get to the merits of cases. The narrative was also heavily
influenced by cases following Conley v. Gibson and its famous "no
set of facts"8 language that had been repeatedly endorsed by the
Supreme Court until it was "retired"9 in ignominy by Twombly.
We have yet to parse fully the impact of Twombly or how
significant an adjustment to practice it will require, but there
will be a shake-out period (which is already well underway) in
which lawyers will do what they have been trained to do-
namely, testing the limits and meaning of the new phraseology
used by the Twombly Court to measure and examine pleadings. 10
Part I will briefly discuss the pre-Twombly view of notice
pleadings. To some extent, our understanding of what the rules
required and what lawyers actually did was a romanticized view
of pleading. Actual pleadings were rarely as "barebones" as we
imagine. Further, in recent decades, rules, statutes, court
decisions, and practical considerations have further eroded the
notice pleading construct.
Part II will give a brief synopsis of the Twombly decision and
then discuss the majority and dissent's views on pleadings
generally.
Part III will examine selected cases post-Twombly and make
some general observations and predictions as to what our new
pleading "narrative" will say. A definitive answer is premature,
but we can at least identify some "plausible" story lines and
areas that will need further clarification from the Supreme Court
or the rulemakers.
8 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007).
9 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 ("Conley's 'no set of facts' language has been
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.., and.., has earned its
retirement.").
10 See, e.g., Mary Swanton, Plausible Pleadings: High Court Offers Defendants
Relief from Frivolous Claims, INSIDECOUNSEL MAG., Aug. 2007, http://
www.insidecounsel.com/section/litigation/1324 ("Defense attorneys in a range of
cases will test the waters by seeking dismissals before discovery starts.").
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The conclusion discusses the difficult questions that have
been left to the lower federal courts to resolve as they apply
Twombly to new scenarios and consider its implications for
federal practice in a wide range of cases.
I. THE OLD NARRATIVE
The old narrative focuses on Rule 8 as the "keystone of the
system of pleading embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."11 Rule 8's substitution of the requirement of "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief"12 for the typical code requirement that the
pleader allege "facts constituting a cause of action" was heralded
as a desirable departure from the technical pleading
requirements of earlier practice. 13 The stated goal of the Federal
Rules reform was to facilitate reaching the merits of disputes by
using discovery, pretrial conferencing and summary judgment to
flesh out claims and narrow issues for trial, leaving notice as the
primary function of the pleadings.1 4
Earlier pleading systems were seriously flawed. Common
law practice centered on successive rounds of pleadings in the
expectation that eventually the dispute would be reduced to a
single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case. In
practice, the system came to be considered a "mere series of traps
11 See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2007).
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
13 See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1332.
14 See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 456 (1941-1943).
Clark goes on to say that:
[A] simple system of direct allegation, so successful a feature of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, furnishes fully adequate information for the court
and litigant without opportunity for quibbling over details, while at the
same time such a system needs the accessory devices [of discovery, pretrial,
and summary judgment] both to expedite trial and to furnish litigants with
all the information as to their opponents' case which they may require. Any
program for reform should therefore start with the benefits of a system of
simple, direct allegation and denial.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)
("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading
system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.").
896 [Vol. 82:893
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and pitfalls for the unwary,-an impediment to justice that must
be abolished."'15 The common law pleading system also "proved to
be excruciatingly slow, expensive, and unworkable" and "better
calculated to vindicate highly technical pleading rules than it
was to dispense justice." 16
Common law pleading was replaced by code pleading which
created its own traps and pitfalls for the unwary; code pleading
emphasized developing facts through the pleadings. Pleadings
were to contain facts, but not evidence or conclusions; the
distinctions drawn among "evidentiary facts," "ultimate facts,"
and "conclusions," as well as the rigidity of pleading a "cause of
action," proved difficult and unwieldy to police 7-resulting again
in "frightful expense" and "endless delay."18  Code pleading
encouraged over-pleading because "under-pleading resulted in
sustained demurrers" and "the proper amount of pleading was
too confining for trial."1 9
Rule 8(a)(2) and so-called notice pleading generated their
own criticisms, confusion, and controversy. No pleading system
is a panacea for the delays, expenses, and stresses of even
meritorious litigation. Despite criticism and suggestions for
proposed revisions to Rule 8, only minor revisions have been
enacted since the Federal Rules were first promulgated and
adopted in 1938.20 The Federal Rules Advisory Committee
15 Note, Common Law Pleading, 10 HARV. L. REV. 238, 239 (1896-97); see also
Clark, supra note 14, at 459; William E. Nelson, The Reform of Common Law
Pleading in Massachusetts 1760-1830: Adjudication as a Prelude to Legislation, 122
U. PA. L. REV 97, 99 (1973).
16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1202.
17 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1216 ('The substitution of 'claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for the code formulation of the 'facts'
constituting a 'cause of action' was intended to avoid the distinctions drawn under
the codes among 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,' and 'conclusions.' "); Jack B.
Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading
Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520-21 (1957) ("[I]t is virtually impossible logically to
distinguish among 'ultimate facts,' 'evidence' and 'conclusions.' "); see also Clark,
supra note 14, at 460 (describing code pleading as "at best wasteful, inefficient, and
time-consuming'); David M. Roberts, Fact-Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing,
65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 395-96 (1980) (discussing code pleadings' "hypertechnical
artifices" and "social cost").
is Thomas E. Skinner, Pre-Trial and Discovery Under the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure, 9 ALA. L. REV. 202, 204 (1957).
19 Id.
20 A 1955 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 8(a)(2), which was never officially
approved because none of the proposals made by the Advisory Committee that year
were acted upon by the Supreme Court, was prepared in response to early criticisms
2008]
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initially and repeatedly endorsed "simplified 'notice pleading,'"
as did the Supreme Court until Twombly. 21
In sum, the old narrative focused on the systemic benefits
that were expected to accrue from procedural reform. Thus, the
old narrative downgraded the importance of pleadings as a
means to manage and limit cases and focused instead on
discovery and pretrial motions to eliminate issues and minimize
surprise at trial.
The old narrative threw out, as unproductive, successive
rounds of technical pleadings and the need to plead facts to
establish each element of each cause of action and instead
required so-called "notice pleading"-pleadings intended to give
defendants notice of the claims asserted against them.
A federal complaint must be able to withstand a Rule 12
motion to dismiss and, under the old narrative, the bar was set
quite low. In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court said that a
motion to dismiss should be denied "unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."22 It was this "no set of
facts" language that the Supreme Court retired in Twombly. 23
That "old" narrative was, however, never an entirely
accurate reflection of pleadings in the federal courts and in the
last few decades has become even less so. 24 Although Federal
and suggestions for amendment of Rule 8(a)(2), which would have called for stricter
pleading practice:
The intent and effect of the rules is to permit the claim to be stated in
general terms; the rules are designed to discourage battles over mere form
of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes
permitted that served either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a
party from having a trial because of mistakes in statement.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1995 REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, reprinted in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 11, at app. F; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, §§ 1201, 1216.
21 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Conley had been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court repeatedly, including in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002), and, of course, it was discussed at length in 2007 in the Twombly opinion. It
was also cited by the Supreme Court after Twombly in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct.
2197 (2007). See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987, 988 (2003) ("If any rule in federal civil procedure deserves the label
'blackletter,' it is notice pleading.").
22 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
23 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
24 See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 21, at 988 (discussing a wide range of
[Vol. 82:893
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Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires only a "short and plain
statement of the claim," relatively few federal complaints
actually model the barebone forms deemed sufficient in the
Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Several reasons can be readily identified. First, old habits die
hard and lawyers, before the Federal Rules, had been accustomed
to drafting the more detailed pleadings required by common law
and code pleading. Code pleading persisted in state systems-
and still does to a degree in some states-and lawyers who
practice in state and federal courts tended to plead more rather
than less. Even as more state systems adopted federal practice
as their model over time by enacting state procedural rules
modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, detailed
pleadings continued to be the norm. Second, on a practical level,
specific pleading requirements for state law causes of action have
tended to affect pleading those claims in federal court. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, litigators often draft more
detailed pleadings for strategic reasons-to send a message to
opposing parties and counsel or to the court about the strength of
their case. More detailed pleadings may encourage settlement
discussions or flesh out information in response to the complaint
or initial discovery. Finally, despite Conley's "simplified 'notice
pleading'" language, the Supreme Court also stressed in that
case that the Federal Rules require the complaint to give the
defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."25 Something more than a bare
averment that the plaintiff wants relief is required. As a result,
it is doubtful whether many federal litigators have either drafted,
or been on the receiving end of, complaints as spare as those in
the approved forms contained in the Appendix to the Federal
Rules.
District courts routinely grant motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, although plaintiffs are also routinely given the
opportunity to replead. Attorneys are well aware that their
complaints must be capable of withstanding a motion to dismiss,
but the bar for dismissal was generally considered a fairly low
one, and the rules are applied even less stringently when a party
substantive areas of law in which particularized fact-based pleading is required and
noting that "[n]otwithstanding its foundation in the Federal Rules and repeated
Supreme Court imprimatur, notice-pleading is a myth").
25 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1215.
2008]
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is litigating pro se. 26 Many complaints still cannot even satisfy
that low bar.
In addition, various Federal Rules amendments, court
decisions, and legislative initiatives have sent subtle and not so-
subtle signals to parties that more detailed pleadings might be
required. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which
requires attorneys or parties to certify that there is a good faith
basis 27 for allegations made in pleadings has no doubt
contributed to more detailed pleadings.
There has always been a heightened pleading requirement
for a limited number of claims, notably fraud. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that "a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake."28
Federal statutes, notably including the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 29 have adopted a
similar approach. Court decisions have imposed non-Rule-based
heightened fact pleading requirements in specific areas of law. 30
It is beyond the scope of this Article to review the extent to
which federal court decisions have sought to require more
detailed pleadings in numerous substantive areas. Courts "talk"
notice pleading, but often require more-whether authorized to
do so by the Federal Rules or a statute or not. One might posit
that the tendency of the federal courts to stray from the express
mandate of Rule 8 made it necessary for the Supreme Court to
repeatedly reject heightened pleading requirements and reassert
that Rule 8 was to be applied uniformly, regardless of the
26 See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
28 Id. 9(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 includes other types of allegations
that require special pleading, including special damages, id. 9(g), challenges to
capacity of a party, id. 9(a), or performance or occurrence of a condition precedent,
id. 9(c).
29 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2000) ("[If an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.").
30 Other commentators have examined this material at length. See Fairman,
supra note 21, at 987-89 & n.3 (reviewing federal case law before and after
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993), and Swierkiewicz in the areas of antitrust, CERCLA, civil rights,
conspiracy, copyright, defamation, negligence, and RICO and concluding that "notice
pleading as a universal standard is a myth" in the federal courts); Koan Mercer,
Comment, "Even in These Days of Notice Pleadings"." Factual Pleading Requirements
in the Fourth Circuit, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (2004); see also WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 11, §§ 1228-38.
[Vol. 82:893
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underlying substantive law, unless Congress established, by
statute, a more restrictive rule or the matter fell within the
limited exceptions specified in Federal Rule Civil Procedure
9(b). 3'
There is no doubt that the widespread perception that
frivolous cases are overwhelming the system and victimizing
defendants, along with the reality that litigation-especially in
complex multi-party or class action cases-has become
significantly more expensive, has increased the pressure to use
pleading standards to maintain docket control.
To the extent that "notice pleading" was never as simple as
originally contemplated, particularly when we consider the
impact of rules changes, statutory mandates, law practice habits,
and various pressures on court dockets mentioned above, it will
make it all the more difficult to assess the impact of any changes
on pleading standards and practices attributable to Twombly.
Commentators over the last couple of decades have
predicted, mourned, or celebrated the purported demise of "notice
pleading"-was Twombly its final obituary?
II. TWOMBLY
It is difficult to summarize the Twombly holding without
examining the history of the telecommunications industry and
31 In Leatherman, the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's attempt to
apply a heightened pleading standard to civil rights cases alleging municipal
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, noting that "[i]n Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect
that the rule meant what it said." Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167-68 (citation
omitted). Because some federal courts did not read Leatherman's holding as
extending beyond cases alleging municipal liability under section 1983, the Supreme
Court again addressed the issue in Swierkiewicz, a Title VII case:
Furthermore, imposing the Court of Appeals' heightened pleading standard
in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include only "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Such a statement must simply "give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." This
simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to
dispose of unmeritorious claims. "The provisions for discovery are so
flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment so
effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily,
synthetic issues detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly
into the open for the inspection of the court."
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (citations omitted) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, and WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1202).
2008]
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antitrust law. Twombly is grounded in antitrust law-
specifically, it deals with the requirements for pleading a
Sherman Act section 132 violation based upon conscious parallel
behavior.
Prior to breaking AT&T's monopoly of local phone service in
1984, AT&T ("Ma Bell") arguably had a "natural monopoly."33
The divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business and the
establishment of so-called "baby Bells" changed the industry with
respect to long distance service, but maintained local telephone
service as a monopoly. The "baby Bells," more formally referred
to as "incumbent local exchange carriers" ("ILECs"), were part of
a system of regional monopolies that remained in place until the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.34 The 1996
Telecommunications Act was intended to fundamentally
restructure local telephone markets and, among other things,
required the regional baby Bells or ILECs to share their
networks with competitors to facilitate market entry and
competition from "competitive local exchange carriers"
("CLECs"). 35  Local providers or ILECs did not compete as
competitors in each others' territories as CLECs.
In Twombly, local telephone and Internet subscribers
brought a putative nationwide class action in the Southern
District of New York against the major ILECs (Bell Atlantic,
BellSouth, Quest, and Verizon), claiming an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
forbids any "contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint
of trade."36 The plaintiffs asserted two principal claims under
section 1: (1) that the defendant ILECs had "engaged in parallel
conduct" to inhibit the growth of CLECs; and (2) that an illegal
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004).
33 See Peter Passell, Economic Scene; Turning the Baby Bells Loose on the Long-
Distance Market, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at D2.
• 4 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
35 See George J. Alexander, Antitrust and the Telephone Industry After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
227, 251-52 (1996); Kathryn Gordon, Note, Enhancing Competition: Are Proposed
Federal Communications Commission Rules That Treat Local Exchange Carrier
Access to Multiple Tenant Environments a Taking?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 106
(2002).
36 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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conspiracy existed among the defendant ILECs to refrain from
competing among themselves. 37
The federal district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, concluding that allegations of parallel business conduct,
without more, did not state a claim under section 1, and that
plaintiffs were required to state additional facts (so-called "plus
factors") tending to exclude independent, self-interested conduct
as an explanation for the parallel actions.38 The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court tested the complaint by
the wrong standard-that "plus factors" were not required to be
pleaded, and that allegations of parallel conduct are sufficient to
support a conspiracy claim at the pleading stage, unless there is
"no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the particular parallelism asserted was the product of collusion
rather than coincidence."39 The Second Circuit held that while a
plaintiff must plead facts that include conspiracy among the
realm of "plausible" possibilities, the pleading of so-called "plus
factors" or additional facts that refute the possibility of
independent action is not required to withstand a motion to
dismiss.40
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and, in a 7-2
decision written by Justice Souter, ordered dismissal of the
complaint, 41 concluding that more factual detail was necessary to
make out a "plausible" complaint that was more than merely an
inference from conscious parallel conduct. 42
A. The Majority Decision in Twombly
The questions considered by the Supreme Court focused on
antitrust law, but the answers went to the heart of "notice"
pleading. The Supreme Court addressed (1) "the proper standard
for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of
parallel conduct,"43 and (2) "whether a section 1 complaint can
survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major
37 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007).
38 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
vacated, 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
39 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955
(2007).
40 See id.
41 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961.
42 See id. at 1965-66.
43 Id. at 1963.
20081
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telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel
conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent
action."44  Justice Souter's opinion, joined by all but two
dissenters, sent mixed messages on pleadings to the bench and
the bar.
The Supreme Court expressly "retired" Conley v. Gibson's
"no set of facts" statement as subject to misunderstanding and
imposed a plausibility test at the pleading stage, 45 but explicitly
rejected a requirement of heightened pleading.46
In discussing plausibility, the Court stated that something
more than "possibility," but not "probability," was required of
pleadings. 47 In the context of antitrust conspiracy claims, "it
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.... [AIllegations of parallel conduct ... must be
placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding
agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be
independent action."48  The Supreme Court concluded that,
without factual enhancement of a bare allegation of parallel
conduct, the complaint gets "close to stating a claim,... [but]
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief.' "49
According to the Court, the plaintiffs had not "nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,"50 so
dismissal was appropriate. The various statements of the
holding leave some confusion as to what facts must be pleaded to
withstand a motion to dismiss in an antitrust context-and even
more confusion if we assume applicability beyond antitrust. On
the one hand, the Court seemed to be placing allegations on a
continuum from "possibility" to "plausibility" to "probability." On
the other hand, the Court expressly rejected movement to a
"heightened" pleading standard,51 and otherwise cited favorably
44 Id. at 1961.
45 See id. at 1969.
46 See id. at 1974.
47 See id. at 1965-66.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1966.
50 Id. at 1974.
51 See id.
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to Conley.52 The Court also did not retreat from its 2002 decision
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, in which it held that a complaint
in an employment discrimination suit need not allege specific
facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 53
B. The Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, saw the
decision as a "dramatic departure from settled procedural law" 54
and argued that it substituted a question of "proof' for what had
been a question of notice. 55
The dissent reviewed the history and policy concerns
underlying the federal pleading requirements and decried the
majority's reliance on so-called "practical concerns" to explain its
retreat from notice pleading. 56 The practical concerns, which
focused on the expense of discovery and confusion to juries, could
be addressed, according to the dissent, by "careful case
management."57  The dissent focused on the potential
implications of a broad reading of the majority opinion. 58 Justice
Stevens also objected to the majority's conflation of summary
judgment standards and initial pleading challenges and,
particularly, to the imposition of an "evidentiary" standard in
evaluating a motion to dismiss. 59
III. A NEW NARRATIVE
So what is the new narrative? How different is it from the
old one?
To some extent the jury is still out, and reasonable persons
may disagree (even though a tougher pleading standard will stop
many cases from reaching a jury). Over 9,400 circuit and district
court cases have not yet worked out all the details.
52 Id. at 1969, 1969 n.8.
53 See id. at 1973-74 (discussing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002)).
54 Id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1984 n.8.
56 See id. at 1975-77.
57 See id. at 1975.
58 See id. at 1988.
59 Id. at 1979.
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The starting point is that the Supreme Court clearly
intended to effect some change-according to the Court, Conley
had been widely misunderstood 60 and now,
after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous
observation [regarding "no set of facts"] has earned its
retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint. 61
So although Twombly was an antitrust case and, more
specifically, the challenged pleadings involved allegations of
conspiracy-and even more specifically, the allegations of
conspiracy were dependent on pleaded inferences from conscious
parallel conduct-it is hard to argue, looking at the broad
language the Supreme Court chose, that Twombly is so limited.
Lower courts have already applied the Twombly
"plausibility" standard in a wide range of cases outside the
antitrust context, 62 including state securities law,63 patent
infringement,64 trademark,65 and eminent domain.66
Only a few cases have explicitly concluded that Twombly is,
or should be, restricted to the antitrust context, 67 and they have
almost certainly already been proven wrong. The Second Circuit,
for example, quickly concluded in a series of early post-Twombly
decisions that the Supreme Court had not meant to limit
Twombly's reach to antitrust conspiracy or even antitrust cases.68
6o Id. at 1969 (majority opinion).
61 Id.
62 See Kendall W. Hannon, Comment, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on
the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(B)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2008) (manuscript at 104), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1091246.
63 See, e.g., Cannon v. GunnAllen Fin., Inc., No. 3:06-0804, 2007 WL 2351313,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2007).
64 See, e.g., Anticancer Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., No. 05-CV-0448-B, 2007 WL
2345025, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007).
65 See Collins v. Marva Collins Preparatory Sch., No. 1:05cv614, 2007 WL
1989828, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2007).
66 See Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, No.
07-2537-CV, 2008 WL 269100 (2d Cir. Feb. 01, 2008).
67 See, e.g., McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("[Retirement of Conley 'no facts' language] does not suggest that Bell Atlantic
changed the pleading requirement ... as articulated in Conley.").
68 See, e.g., Transhorn, Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp. (In re Elevator Antitrust
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The Second Circuit is playing a role in shaping the new
narrative. In June 2007, just three weeks after the Twombly
decision, the Second Circuit decided Iqbal v. Hasty69 and became
the first circuit court of appeals to analyze Twombly in depth. In
Iqbal, the Second Circuit considered an interlocutory review of
the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss most
of the section 1983 claims asserted by a Pakistani Muslim
detained after September 11, 2001.70 The defendants' motions to
dismiss were based upon qualified immunity and lack of personal
jurisdiction, as well as failure to state a claim.71 The Second
Circuit was asked to consider the extent to which a plaintiff was
required to plead specific facts to overcome a qualified immunity
defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage-a question which had not
been resolved in the circuit. 72 The court confronted Twombly
head-on in resolving the pleading standard questions raised in
the appeal, but recognized that "[c]onsiderable uncertainty
concerning the standards for assessing the adequacy of
pleadings" 73 had been created by the Supreme Court's decision in
Twombly. Although Twombly appears to require that a
complaint must include claims for relief that are plausible, and
not just possible, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in
Twombly and just two weeks later in Erickson v. Pardus, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected any heightened pleading
standard and reaffirmed Rule 8(a)(2)'s "liberal pleading
standards." 74
Litig.), 502 F.3d 47, 50 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) ("A narrow view of Twombly would have
limited its holding to the antitrust context, or perhaps only to Section 1 claims; but
we have concluded that Twombly affects pleading standards somewhat more
broadly."); ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2 (2d Cir.
2007) ("We have declined to read Twombly's flexible 'plausibility standard' as
relating only to antitrust cases."); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007)
("We are reluctant to assume that all of the language of Bell Atlantic [v. Twombly]
applies only to section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or,
slightly more broadly, only to antitrust cases."); see also Hannon, supra note 62
(manuscript at 104) (noting that a review of post-Twombly district court decisions
showed that "[a]ntitrust ... comprised only 3.7% ... of all cases citing Twombly[,
with] the remainder.., representative of every substantive area of law").
69 490 F.3d at 143.
70 See id. at 147-48.
71 See id. at 150.
72 See id. at 153.
73 Id. at 155.
74 Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 n.4 (2007).
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The Second Circuit, in analyzing Twombly, concluded that
the Supreme Court "intended to make some alteration in the
regime of pure notice pleading that had prevailed in the federal
courts since Conley v. Gibson."75 The Second Circuit inventoried
the conflicting signals in Twombly to ascertain whether the
Supreme Court had indeed mandated a "new and heightened
pleading standard."76 In favor of such a standard, the Second
Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court's explicit disavowal of the
Conley "no set of facts" language 77 and the determination that
more than notice of a claim is needed to allege a Sherman Act
section 1 violation based on competitors' parallel conduct.78 The
court also pointed to the serious concerns expressed about "the
ability of careful case management to weed out early in the
discovery process a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement"79
and the encapsulation of the Supreme Court's "various
formulations of what is required into what it labeled 'the
plausibility standard.' "80
The Second Circuit also inventoried the "linguistic signals"
that pointed away from a heightened pleading standard and
suggested that Twombly might be limited to the context of
Sherman Act section 1 allegations-or even only Sherman Act
section 1 allegations relying on competitors' parallel conduct.8'
The signals referenced by the Iqbal court included Twombly's
explicit disclaimer that it was requiring heightened fact pleading
and its emphasis on the continued viability of Swierkiewicz,82 as
well as its approving acknowledgement of the adequacy of a
generalized allegation of negligence in Form 9.83 The Second
75 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155. The Second Circuit noted that "it would be cavalier to
believe that the Court's rejection of the 'no set of facts' language from Conley, which
has been cited by federal courts at least 10,000 times in a wide variety of contexts
(according to a Westlaw search), applies only to section 1 antitrust claims." Id. at
157 n.7.
76 Id. at 155.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 156 (reviewing nine different variations that the Twombly court used to
describe the pleading standard).
7.1 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968). The Second Circuit noted that the
Twombly Court "used the word 'plausibility' or an adjectival or adverbial form of [it]
fifteen times (not counting quotations)." Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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Circuit also noted the Court's failure to disclaim prior statements
in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit that summary judgment and control of
discovery should be used by courts and litigants "'to weed out
unmeritorious claims'"84 and its statement in Erickson v.
Pardus, in an opinion issued just two weeks after Twombly, that
"'[s]pecific facts are not necessary [for a pleading that satisfies
Rule 8(a)(2)]';8 5 the statement need only 'give the defendant fair
notice of what.., the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.' "86
In Iqbal, the Second Circuit concluded that Twombly was not
limited to an antitrust context and that the Supreme Court "is
not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading,
but is instead requiring a flexible 'plausibility standard,' which
obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations
in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render
the claim plausible."87
Although Iqbal may help clarify our understanding of
Twombly, it is less clear how one would apply a flexible
plausibility standard. When is "amplification" needed to render a
complaint plausible and in what contexts? If "flexible
plausibility" does not apply equally to all cases but depends on
complexity, issue, and context, we are adding layers of
complexity to what the Federal Rules drafters had contemplated
would be a fairly simple and straightforward test.
Most of the circuit court cases decided so far have involved
district court decisions on motions made pre-Twombly. These
decisions tend to "plug" in Twombly as an additional citation in
support of the decision, giving a nod to the Supreme Court and
demonstrating that the most recent Supreme Court views have
been considered. The district courts now deciding post-Twombly
motions will have to fill out the contours of this new narrative.
I suspect, having reviewed a number of recent cases, that
some lower courts are avoiding the tough decisions by simply
84 Id. at 157 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993)).
85 Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)) (alterations in
original).
86 Id. (quoting Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957) (internal quotation marks omitted)))).
87 Id. at 157-58.
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citing Twombly, but noting, if a motion to dismiss is to be
granted, that the complaint would have failed under the more
permissive Conley standard as well.
Some courts, at least, will read Twombly as requiring that
more facts be pleaded-at least in some types of cases. If that is
true, does this start us on the road back to pre-1938 Code
pleading where parties had to plead facts? If so, we should
remember the difficulties courts had then in drawing distinctions
between conclusions, evidence, and fact statements.
So what are the implications of Twombly? The ripples get
wider as more courts contemplate Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motions in a post-Twombly world.
What are the possibilities?
1. Can Twombly be limited to Sherman Act section 1
antitrust conspiracy claims? This possibility is highly
unlikely based on the broad language with regard to
pleading in Justice Souter's majority opinion and the
heartfelt eulogy to notice pleading in Justice Stevens'
dissent. Sheer numbers of non-antitrust district court
and circuit court cases citing Twombly in just the last
nine months make it apparent that most courts will not
try to limit Twombly to its facts.88
2. Can Twombly be limited to conspiracy cases? An
argument could be made that the Supreme Court was
only addressing the adequacy of pleadings alleging a
conspiracy in the absence of any direct evidence.
Conspiracy claims are often raised in securities and
RICO8 9 cases, as well as in other complex matters
involving both public and private enforcement. Pleading
in most securities cases is governed by the PSLRA and a
plethora of substantive decisions by the Supreme Court
on securities law, so securities matters are unlikely to be
significantly affected by Twombly. Although conspiracy
complaints not buttressed by direct evidence of
8 See Hannon, supra note 62 (manuscript at 104), (finding, in an empirical
study of post-Twombly district court decisions on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, that "courts
have applied the decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8" with
atntitrust cases comprising only 3.7% of the sample).
89 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-64 (West 2006).
910 [Vol. 82:893
THE AFTER-SHOCKS OF TWOMBLY
conspiracy are more likely to be tested by Rule 12(b)(6)
motions after Twombly, the cases citing a Twombly
"plausibility" standard are not limited to conspiracy
claims or complex litigation. As conspirators generally
make every effort to avoid leaving direct evidence of a
conspiracy, plaintiffs have come to rely on the
availability of discovery to flesh out their allegations. A
higher bar for withstanding motions to dismiss, which
requires plaintiffs to plead facts that would tend to go
beyond circumstantial evidence from which inferences
might be drawn, is likely to drive some potentially
meritorious cases out of court.
3. To what extent will Twombly impact class action
practice in the federal courts? Twombly itself was a
putative nationwide class action, but class actions are
regularly brought in many other substantive law areas,
including employment law, securities law,
environmental law, and consumer protection. Certainly,
the focus on the costs of discovery in "big" cases and,
particularly, the disproportionate costs on defendants in
most class actions, are equally relevant in every such
case. Lower courts have picked up on Twombly's
concerns about excessive discovery costs.
Using motions to dismiss as a mechanism to control
litigation costs, however, is an inefficient approach that
may have the effect of barring legitimate, meritorious
claims that would have continued-at least through
discovery-pre- Twombly.
4. Can Twombly be limited to large, complex cases,
particularly those in which discovery is likely to be
costly and asymmetrical? Should it be? Obviously, this
classification would not only include the antitrust,
conspiracy, and class action matters described above,
but it would also include any multi-party (and even two-
party) cases that involve complex legal and/or factual
claims and the likelihood that the parties will engage in
extensive and expensive discovery. A few courts and
commentators have suggested that Twombly might be
limited in this way, but that view is also unlikely to
prevail.
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Where discoverable information is disproportionately in
defendant's control, defendant's incentives to dispose of
such cases at the earliest stage are significantly greater
than plaintiffs incentives for early resolution. Plaintiffs
in such cases require discovery to flesh out their claims
and amass admissible evidence for trial. Defendants
have greater incentives to avoid discovery-if plaintiffs'
claims lack merit, defendants will prevail, but only after
expending considerable resources; if plaintiffs' claims
have merit, defendants will resist providing evidence of
their own wrongdoing, at least to the extent that
procedural rules permit them to do so. A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal permits defendants to avoid the discovery
process entirely.
The Federal Rules have, for the most part, avoided
developing special procedures for different classes of
cases. It would be troublesome to apply a different
"plausibility" standard to "big" cases simply because the
stakes are higher and the costs of litigation are more
onerous. The Supreme Court majority in Twombly did
not explicitly suggest a different standard for "big"
cases, but the Court's emphasis on costly antitrust
discovery and the perceived inability of trial judges to
manage such cases suggests that possibility.90 It would
be troubling to take such potential costs into account
only for those parties best able to withstand such costs-
and even more troubling to make that decision at the
pre-answer stage.
In addition, following that path assumes that the
majority's perceptions about the discovery process are
entirely correct 9' and that limiting pleadings is the best
90 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007).
91 See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 18-19 (2003) (discussing the absence of an empirical basis for the
widespread belief in frivolous litigation); Fairman, supra note 21, at 1060-61
(discussing the use of heightened pleadings as a rationale for protection from
abusive discovery and referring to the underlying basis as lacking foundation,
"except [for] purely anecdotal comments"); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982,
995-96 (2003) (discussing the litigation crisis as a "product of assumption" with
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way to address the perceived problem. Although
discovery is unquestionably expensive, the sources cited
by the majority opinion heavily rely on commentators
and cases from the early- to mid-1980s for its claims
about the effects of frivolous claims and excessive
discovery on parties and the ineffectualness of courts to
address the problems.9 2 This ignores the significant
efforts that the courts have made, in large part as a
result of amendments to the Federal Rules since that
time, to address those very issues. The amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983, 1993, and
2000 have given the parties and courts greater resources
to control runaway, excessive discovery. The
amendments to the rules include giving greater
authority to district court judges to exercise meaningful
managerial control of the scheduling and scope of
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16;93 the
imposition of presumptive time limits on depositions, 94
and restrictions on the numbers of interrogatories; 95 the
mandatory exchange of basic information under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) to permit more targeted
discovery and encourage earlier settlement
discussions;96 and, importantly, the narrowing of the
scope of discovery with broader discovery available only
with court approval upon a good cause showing.
Frivolous pleadings have been addressed in
modifications to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in
1983 and 1993 and in federal statutes such as the
PSLRA.97 These changes are not reflected at all in
Twombly, which seems to be caught in a 1980s time
warp.
empirical data in short supply).
92 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
94 Id. 30.
95 Id. 33(a).
96 Id. 26(a).
97 See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)(2) (2000) ("If the court makes a finding ... that a
party or attorney violated any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion, the court
shall impose sanctions on such party or attorney ... ").
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5. Should Twombly apply in all federal cases? If it is not
limited to antitrust conspiracy cases, it arguably should
apply to all cases; Rule 8(a) applies to all civil cases, as
does Rule 12(b)(6). It would be inappropriate for the
lower courts to graft distinctions onto the Federal Rules
which would apply in only certain cases; the rules
amendment process or congressional enactments provide
the appropriate mechanism for such a fundamental
change.
The Supreme Court appeared to consider how its rule
would apply in even the simplest federal case. In the
course of the oral argument in Twombly and in its
opinions, the Court kept returning to the model form for
pleading negligence and concluded that the barebones
form satisfied Rule 8(a)98 In other words, the Court did
not highlight any difference between simple cases
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Procedure and the
Appendix of Forms, and the more complex litigation that
often drives procedural reform.
Perhaps given the Supreme Court's focus on unbridled
large-case discovery and the perceived inability of trial
judges to control it, such a distinction is being made. It
is worth noting that contemplating changing the rules to
deal with complex cases in general, or antitrust cases in
particular, has been repeatedly considered and rejected,
and may very well be undesirable. 99
A focus on runaway discovery costs and pretrial excesses
that force nuisance settlements may be a valid concern,
but we should question whether the best approach for
addressing that problem is to tighten entry into the
federal courts by making it easier to dismiss complaints
prior to discovery.
91 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971 n.10.
99 See, e.g., the discussion by Chief Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal
draftsman of the Federal Rules, speaking for the Second Circuit in Nagler v.
Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957), an antitrust price discrimination action,
holding that it is improper to insist on stricter pleading requirements in some cases
but not in others: "It is true that antitrust litigation may be of wide scope ... so that
defense must be diffuse, prolonged, and costly .... But it is quite clear that the
federal rules contain no special exceptions for antitrust cases .... [I]nstead there
was adopted a uniform system for all cases ... " Id. at 322-23.
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A determination that Twombly applies to all civil cases
does not resolve the more difficult questions as to what
"applying" Twombly might mean in specific cases or
specific types of cases. The recent spike in the number
of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in civil rights
actions 00 raises serious questions about disparate
impact of applications of Twombly to situations and
cases not directly contemplated by the Supreme Court
and echoes the concerns that were raised about
applications of Rule 11 to civil rights cases after the
1983 amendment to that rule.10 1 Such effects may be
unanticipated consequences, but the broad language in
Twombly leaves a great deal to the discretion of the
district courts in applying the rules. Although the
Supreme Court specifically disavowed the institution of
a heightened pleading standard, 1 2 as the Second Circuit
recognized in Iqbal, the "Court's explanation for its
holding indicated that it intended to make some
alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading" but the
"nature and extent of that alteration is not clear because
the Court's explanation contains several, not entirely
consistent, signals. ' 10 3 It will take some time before we
can reliably predict, and apply, the Twombly standard in
a wide range of cases.
Assuming Twombly applies broadly, what is it likely to
mean for the federal courts? In the short-run, we would
expect a significant increase in the number of Rule
12(b)(6) motions as defendants test the limits. 10 4 For
some period of time, the battleground in litigations will
shift from summary judgment motions to pre-answer,
pre-discovery motions to dismiss, challenging the
adequacy of pleadings in a wide range of cases.
Depending on how courts rule in different districts and
100 See infra note 105.
101 See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1202 (noting that the
requirements for pleading in civil rights suits are more demanding than the Conley
standard).
102 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973-74.
103 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
104 The sheer (and increasing) volume of cases citing Twombly demonstrates
that this is already occurring.
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circuits on different types of cases, we can expect a shift
in pleadings to include more facts. Lawyers are
adaptable. What will be more difficult to assess is
whether certain types of potentially meritorious claims
are more affected than others by the new regime and
whether such claims will not be made because the new
standards would find them not "plausible." One
preliminary observation which jumps out from even a
cursory review of recent district and circuit court
determinations of Rule 12(b)(6) motions is what appears
to be a disproportionate number of civil rights cases in
which the pleadings are being challenged using
Twombly.10 5
From a defendant's perspective, Twombly makes a Rule
12(b)(6) motion a desirable first gambit. Post-Twombly,
a defendant would predict a higher rate of success on
such a motion and, although motions to dismiss are by
no means cost-free, they offer a more aggressive stance
than settlement, negotiation, or merely responding to
the complaint. A successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion has the
satisfactory "upside" of obtaining dismissal of the action.
We will also have to wait and see what message the
lower courts take from the Supreme Court's skepticism
of trial courts' ability to effectively manage cases and
contain unnecessary and expensive discovery. The
Court's emphasis on discovery costs as a factor in
assessing pleadings reopens the debate as to whether
such concerns should be relevant in screening
potentially meritorious claims.
6. What are the implications of conflating the standards for
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment
and directed verdicts?
The Twombly opinion engages in a bit of sleight-of-hand
to the extent that the effect is to conflate the standards
for motions to dismiss, summary judgments, and
105 See Hannon, supra note 62 (manuscript at 104) (noting that a review of post-
Twombly district court decisions showed a "significant departure from previous
dismissal practice" in the civil rights field, with the rate of dismissal in those cases
spiking).
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directed verdicts. In Twombly, the Supreme Court
correctly states that, based on prior Supreme Court
precedent, "[aln antitrust conspiracy plaintiff with
evidence showing nothing beyond parallel conduct is not
entitled to a directed verdict"'10 6 and that "at the
summary judgment stage a § 1 plaintiffs offer of
conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the possibility
that the defendants were acting independently."'107 This
directed verdict and summary judgment standard based
on "evidence" somehow morphs into an appropriate
pleading standard.
The problem with this conflation of summary judgment
and pre-answer challenges to pleading is the focus on
evidence. At the summary judgment stage-and
certainly at the directed verdict stage-plaintiffs can be
expected and required to produce evidence that goes
beyond mere allegations or even circumstantial
evidence. It is more troublesome to insist that plaintiffs
provide such evidence as a prerequisite for withstanding
a motion to dismiss. Thus, in Twombly, the majority
holds that a plaintiff must present something to bolster
the "admissible circumstantial evidence [of parallel
business behavior] from which the fact finder may infer
agreement," but which falls short of "conclusively
establishing agreement ... or itself constituting a
Sherman Act offense."' 08  The Court's opinion jumps
from a description of what is required for a directed
verdict or summary judgment to the essential question
to be decided in Twombly, "what a plaintiff must plead
in order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act,"
and assumes a connection between these standards. 10 9
As Justice Stevens notes, "a heightened production
burden at the summary judgment stage does not
translate into a heightened pleading burden at the
106 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964.
107 Id.
108 Id. (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954)).
109 Id.
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complaint stage" I 0 -unless it now does.
7. What impact will Twombly have in the state courts?
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion, "26
States and the District of Columbia utilize as their
standard for dismissal of a complaint the [Conley 'no
facts'] language the majority repudiates." '' State courts
and state practitioners will have to determine whether
Twombly should apply to state practice and, if so, what
application of Twombly might mean for state practice. 1 2
CONCLUSION
Much work remains for the lower courts and, perhaps the
Supreme Court, in fleshing out the contours of a post-Twombly
pleading regime.
There remain a number of difficult questions for the courts
to resolve: First, if pleadings are to be fact-based pleadings, how
much amplification of facts is required? Although detailed
factual allegations are not required, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a
'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief," and this necessitates "some factual allegation in the
complaint." 13 Does the subject matter or complexity of a case
necessarily affect the level of factual detail required? In other
words, must plaintiffs plead more if discovery is likely to be
costly?
Second, Twombly requires pleadings to demonstrate
"plausibility" rather than mere "possibility" of entitlement. What
does a "plausibility" standard add? What does the Second Circuit
gloss of "flexible plausibility" add to the Supreme Court's test?
Third, what remains of pleadings on information and belief
pleading after Twombly?
Fourth, should challenges to a plaintiffs case at different
110 Id. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 1978.
112 See, e.g., Andree Sophia Blumstein, A Higher Standard, 43 TENN. B.J. 12, 14
(2007) ('Tennessee, like many states, views federal interpretations as persuasive or
at least as useful guidance .... "); Halloran, supra note 7, at 23 ("Arizona courts
typically give considerable weight to the federal interpretations of the rules ....
Consequently, Twombly is likely to have a significant impact on Arizona
proceedings.").
113 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3 (majority opinion).
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stages in a proceeding have to satisfy different tests or should
there simply be a single test without regard to whether the
challenge occurs at the pre-answer stage, by summary judgment,
or during the course of a trial?
Fifth, and most importantly, is it time to amend Rule 8(a) to
clarify the appropriate pleading standard?
Justice Stevens' dissent stated that "[w]hether the Court's
actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust treble-damages
cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint will
inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the
future will answer."114 We are already in that future and his
question has probably been answered definitively-at least until
the Supreme Court makes some further statement. As to all of
the other questions, only time will answer those and, no doubt,
raise new questions as well.
114 Id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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